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How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes
Anita Bernstein*
I. Introduction
Though forewarned by the historian S.F.C. Milsom that their hopes
are doomed to be dashed, scholars and activists continue to believe that
new causes of action can right neglected wrongs and tighten the fit between
injuries and remedies.1 Some of these writers purport simply to describe
what the courts have done, while others admit that they are engaged in
advocacy; all of them state elements of a new cause of action. A small
percentage of these efforts ripen into what come to be accepted as "new
torts." 2 This formation-and-birth process is veiled in mystery and
ignorance, reminiscent of what young unmarried Victorian women were
thought to know about how to make a new baby.
In an effort to lift the veil and generalize about the successful creation
of new torts, I ventured a simple inductive approach. First, I drew up a
list of new torts, unconstrained by defining criteria, as they occurred to
me; Dean Keeton's enumeration provided a starting point.3 Next, a
* Professor of Law and Norman & Edna Freehling Scholar, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
Thanks to Katharine Baker, Fred Bosselman, Jacob Corr6, Stuart Deutsch, David Gerber, Sanford
Greenberg, Steven Harris, Jim Huttenhower, and Richard Warner for their comments following a
Chicago-Kent roundtable presentation of this Paper;, to Jim Lindgren, for his written comments; and
to the Marshall Ewell research fund at Chicago-Kent. I am grateful also to the participants at the
Keeton Symposium, especially its hosts, William Powers, David Anderson, and David Robertson, who
so engagingly combined hospitality and tough questions.
1. See S.F.C. Milsom, A Pageant in Modern Dress, 84 YALE L.J. 1585, 1585 (1975) (reviewing
GRANT GILMoRE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974)) ("The law is a reiterated failure to classify
life.-).
2. The earliest use of "new tort" in this sense that I have found is William L. Prosser, Intentional
Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874 (1939) (suggesting that decisions
in more than 100 cases spanning more than two decades call for the recognition of a separate tort of
intentional infliction of mental suffering). Contemporary invocations of the concept include Rory
Laneman, Protecting Speech From Private Abridgement: Introducing the Tort of Suppression, 25 Sw.
U. L. REV. 223, 243, 238-43 (1996) (discussing how tort law "continues to grow" and suggesting
several factors to be addressed in developing new torts), and Terry R. Spencer, Do Not Fold Spindle
or Mutilate: The Trend Towards Recognition of Spoliation as a Separate Tort, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 37,
45-47 (1993) (discussing the development of the new tort of spoliation).
3. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 3-4 (5th ed. 1984)
(listing torts that did not fit into standard categories when they first arose "but nevertheless have been
held to be torts").
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companion list: that is, new causes of action proposed in law reviews that
have not been accepted or that looked unlikely to be accepted in the future.
What did the successes have in common with one another, and the failures
with their fellow failures? Although mystery and ignorance were in the
end not defeated, I reached a few conclusions that bear, I think, on the
general tasks of understanding and effecting doctrinal change.4
Space constraints limited my inquiry to the United States and the
twentieth century, even though the process of common-law change did not
begin here and now. Because my interest is in contemporary law reform,
however, this ahistoricism may not matter. More fundamental was the
need to define "new tort," however roughly, in the absence of agreement
about what the phrase means.5
A new tort, let us suppose, is a tort claim generally identified by
scholars and practitioners as both novel and free-standing. Though usually
a common-law claim, it might take shape in a new statute.' By "novel"
I refer to originality rather than current newness, and so some of the new
torts in this Paper are no longer young.
What is excluded by the word free-standing falls into three categories.
First, one may put aside changes in the law of torts that expand the domain
of damages-by allowing new plaintiffs to sue for loss of consortium,7 for
instance, or allowing recovery based on fear of future illness t-rather than
identify a new form of wrongful conduct. Also excluded as not free-
standing are subclasses of negligence that expand duties of care, such as
educational malpractice or wrongful life;9 new torts as seen in this Paper
4. As I have argued elsewhere, even a preliminary attempt to build a theory of law reform offers
benefits in practice to both reformers and their antagonists. See Anita Bernstein, Better Liing Through
Crime and Tort, 76 B.U. L. REV. 169, 191-92 (1996).
5. See Robert F. Blomquist, "New Torts': A Critical History, Taxonomy, andAppraisal, 95 DICK.
L. REV. 23, 36-37, 128-29 (1990) ("[T]he words [new tort] have meant different things to different
writers and have varied in different contexts.").
6. See Kenneth M. Murchison, Enforcing Environmental Standards Under State Law: The
Louisiana Environmental Qualiy Act, 57 LA. L. REv. 497, 555 (1997) (arguing that citizen enforce-
ment provisions create new torts); see also infra notes 16, 98-109 (describing a new tort concerning
harms caused by pornography).
7. See Migliori v. Airborne Freight Corp., 952 F. Supp. 38, 43 n.7 (D. Mass. 1997) (detailing
the role of the judge in creating a new cause of action pertaining to consortium based on the wrongful
death of a plaintiff's child); Coleman v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 660 N.E.2d 424, 425 (Ohio 1993)
(recognizing a child's claim for loss of consortium based on an injury to a parent).
8. See Buckley v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 79 F.2d 1337, 1346 (2nd Cir. 1996) (allowing
a fear-of-cancer claim based on asbestos exposure); Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 923 P.2d
1154, 1155 (N.M. 1996) (allowing a claim for the fear of developing AIDS).
9. See Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 414-15 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing an educational
malpractice tort); Procanik v. Cillio, 478 A.2d 755, 762 (N.J. 1984) (allowing a claim by an infant
against his physician for the failure to diagnose congenital rubella syndrome that, if known to the
mother, would have caused her to terminate her pregnancy). Other examples are reviewed in Timothy
M. Cavanaugh, Comment, A New Tort in California: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (For
Married Couples Only), 41 HASTINGS L.J. 447 (1990) (discussing spousal infliction of emotional
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grow mainly in the fields of intentional torts and strict liability. The third
exclusion consists of expansions in private rights of action based on viola-
tions of the Constitution or statutes; although these claims function much
as new torts do, they have a different genesis and a more diffuse constit-
uency. In short, new torts are roughly what torts people say they are,
except that some of what have been called new torts are eliminated on the
ground that they are not free-standing and that statutory reforms may
occasionally qualify as new torts."0
Four successes have emerged under these criteria: intentional infliction
of emotional distress, strict products liability, invasion of privacy, and
wrongful discharge from employment.1" All of these claims, though
linked to past causes of action, have achieved the designation of new torts.
The first three have achieved legitimacy as novel and free-standing by the
addition of new sections in the Restatement of Torts. 2 Writers associated
with their formation have won praise, 3 as well as the indirect honor of
distress, a subclass of negligence); Maureen Castellano, Wayward Clerics: Sinners or Torfeasors?,
N.J. L.J., Apr. 22, 1996, at 5; Robert A. Clifford, Workplace Violence Generates Two Kinds of Torts,
NAT'L L.J., Apr. 17, 1995, at C32 (explaining how the new torts of negligent hiring and negligent
retention in the employment context grew from the ordinary negligence doctrine in master-servant rela-
tionships); and Robert A. Clifford & Pamela S. Menaker, 'Wrongftd Adoption" Gains Acceptance,
NAT'L L.J., Sept. 28, 1992, at 38, 39 (discussing the Wisconsin, Illinois, and Minnesota courts' recog-
nition of the new tort of wrongful adoption as an extension of negligence).
10. These definitional criteria, offered as approximateguidelines, are not essential to my argument
about origins of new torts; a reader may favor a broader definition (such as Blomquist's, see Blomquist,
supra note 5, at 36-37 (describing the "new tort" as a tool-"a signal, or marker for addressing the
ramifications and implications of judicial creativity in responding to cases that seek to change existing
tort doctrine"), or the view that Gary Schwartz expressed to me at the Keeton Symposium that erosions
or repeals of immunities and defenses can be counted as new torts) without rejecting what is proposed
here. The handful of causes of action that fit my criteria are particularly representative of what is
salient about twentieth-century new torts.
11. Professor Blomquist offers a longer list, unconstrained by the free-standing criterion. See
Blomquist, supra note 5, at 47-50 (discussing negligent infliction of emotional distress); id. at 50-52
(discussing wrongful life).
12. The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress may be found in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). Another version of this tort was included in the supplement to the
first Restatement. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (Supp. 1948). The elements of strict products liability
may be found at RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); the tort of invasion of privacy may
be found at RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-6521 (1965).
13. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, at 849 (calling the formation of the privacy tort
"perhaps the outstanding illustration of the influence of legal periodicals upon the courts"); Cornelius
J. Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Understanding the Development of the Law of Wrongful
Discharge, 66 WASH. L. REV. 719, 722-24 (1991) (praising the skillful advocacy of Lawrence Blades
in calling for a tort remedy protecting employees from bad faith discharges); John W. Wade, William
L. Prosser: Some Impressions and Recollections, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1255, 1255 (1972) ("Prosser on
Torts! It has a completed sound, a belonging sound, a natural sound, a sound to be remembered for
years to come."). One of Prosser's later writings, Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) [hereinafter Prosser, Assault], is the second-most-cited article
ever published in the Yale Law Journal. See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Articles from the Yale
Law Journal, 100 YALE L.J. 1449, 1462 (1991).
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attack.14 Reformers that want to create a particular new tort, I contend,
should study this handful of precedents.
Proposals that have yet to succeed include suggestions by Richard
Delgado and others to remedy certain harms of hate speech15 and the
famous Dworkin-MacKinnon statute-enacted in Minneapolis and
Indianapolis-that declared pornography a threat to civil rights and
provided a tort-like damages remedy.1" Such new-tort proposals are
14. For a critical sampler, see PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES 36-39 (1990) (recounting the development of strict products liability and the unforeseen
consequences of its application); Reed Dickerson, Was Prosser's Folly Also Traynor's? or Should the
Judge's MonumentBe Moved to a Firmer Site?, 2 HOFsTRA L. REV. 469, 470 (1974) (criticizing Judge
Roger Traynor for his role in giving strict products liability a reach that undermines statutory authority
as embodied in the consumer protection measures of the Uniform Commercial Code); Daniel Givelber,
The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 42, 45 (1982) (stating that the new
tort has resulted in an "embarrassment of adjudication unencumbered by doctrine"); Andrew P.
Morriss, Developing a Framework for Empirical Research on the Common Law: General Principles
and Case Studies of the Decline of Employment-At-Will, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 999, 1070-94
(1995) (questioning the practical effects on employee terminations produced by common-law changes
to the employment-at-will doctrine); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell
to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291, 362 (1983) (stating that the
"common law private-facts tort has failed to become a usable and effective means of redress for
plaintiffs").
15. See Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name-calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982) (describing the limitations of current legal
protection from racial insults and advocating a new action based on a defendant's intent to demean
through reference to race); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim's Story, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2320, 2356-61 (1989) (arguing that racist hate speech should be
recognized and regulated as a sui generis category of speech rather than brought under First Amend-
ment exceptions such as the "fighting words" doctrine); John T. Nockleby, Hate Speech in Context:
The Case of Verbal Threats, 42 BuFF. L. REv. 653,699-711 (1994) (proposing a tort of racial intimi-
dation that would allow recovery if a victim could show that she was the target of a fear-inducing
violent threat motivated by racial animosity).
16. The statute is summarized and discussed in American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d
323,324-26 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). CatharineMacKinnonhas disavowed
tort law as a device for feminist change and would presumably object to the new-tort label for the
statute. See CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 158 (1979)
(faulting tort for affirming "the extremes of conventional role expectations" about women); id. at 88
(stating that "tort theory fails to capture" the broad harms of sexual harassment for women);
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINISr THEORY OF THE STATE 208 (1989) (objecting to
the concept of causation as understood in tort law). But the antipornography statute had at least some
origin in torts: MacKinnon and Dworkinhad previously worked on a civil complaint on behalf of Linda
Marchiano, an actress who contended that she was forced by beatings, threats, and kidnapping to star
in the film DEEP THROAT (Vanguard Films Productions 1972). The draft complaint, which was later
abandoned, alleged assault and battery as well as civil rights violations. See Paul Brest & Ann
Vandenberg, Politics, Feminism, and the Constitution: The Anti-Pornography Movement in
Minneapolis, 39 STAN. L. REV. 607, 615 (1987). Some commentators share my view that MacKinnon
and Dworkin wrote a new tort. See Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78
CORNELL L. REv. 575, 576 n.6 (1993) (comparing the antipornography statute to a tort action that has
been created by statute rather than common law); Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101
HARV. L. REV. 10, 65 n.257 (1987) (suggesting that the antipornography statute was based on "tort
theories").
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dormant rather than dead, and so these failures may ultimately prevail.
However, circumstances suggest that these proposed new torts have experi-
enced a different fate from the four mentioned above. Did the failures fail
because they were too radical?17 Unmanageable?" I think not, mainly
because successful new torts warrant the same adjectives to about the same
degree.19 The enemy of proposed new torts is indeed conservatism, but
this conservatism has been misunderstood. A success-and-failure com-
parison reveals how these approaches have fared in their struggles to
overcome conservative resistance.
To complete the survey, there remain some miscellaneous instances.
An inchoate tort, one that has neither succeeded nor failed, is spoliation,
which has found acceptance in a few states and has enjoyed some
flickering support in the law reviews.2" This half-developed tort illus-
trates the traits that correlate with both success and failure. I go on to
suggest that the common law has quietly adopted the equivalent of new
torts, though not labeled as such. Finally, in what may be a foolhardy
public test of my theorizing, I venture predictions regarding new-tort
proposals, coming from both the activist left and an opposite perspective
that regards the activist left with suspicion. Both Jane Larson's tort of
sexual fraud (a common-law action, with a proposed Restatement section
drafted'2 ) and Rory Lancman's tort of suppression are, I think,
unlikely to succeed in the immediate future. Another prediction pertains
to the new tort of sexual harassment, which may succeed if it can defeat
conservatism in its various manifestations, as I describe below.u Victory
for any of these new torts, however, appears remote.
17. See Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 162 (1992) (characterizing
the hate-speech tort as one of several "radical reconceptualizations of existing bodies of doctrine").
18. Cf. Leslie Benton Sander & Carol Berry, Recovery for Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress Attendant to Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 AIZ. L. REv. 1247, 1253-59 (1995)
(discussing erroneous fears about triviality, fradulent claims, and unmanageability that accompany
resistance to emotional-distress new torts).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 110-15. Sander and Berry make a related point about the
fear of fraudulent claims of emotional distress: Good evidence exists that some physical injuries are
easier to fake than emotional ones. See Sander & Berry, supra note 18, at 1252.
20. The tort of spoliation, which can be used to remedy the intentional or negligent destruction
of physical evidence necessary for civil or criminal litigation, is studied as a new-tort case history in
Spencer, supra note 2, at 45-60 (surveying state law). In Christian v. Kenneth Chandler Construction
Co., 658 So. 2d 408, 413-14 (Ala. 1995), the Alabama Supreme Court performed a similar count and
found rejection of this tort the majority view.
21. See Steffan Nolte, The Spoliation Tort: An Approach to Underlying Principles, 26 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 351 (1994); Spencer, supra note 2.
22. See Jane E. Larson, 'Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature 'Deceit"': A
Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 453 (1993) (suggesting liability under the
tort of sexual fraud for one who "fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention,
or law, for the purpose of inducing another to consent to sexual relations in reliance upon it").
23. See Lancan, supra note 2, at 238-62 (proposing and explaining a new tort, suppression,
which would protect free speech from abridgment by private individuals).
24. See infra notes 123 and accompanying text.
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Most new tort proposals indeed will fail. New causes of action are
formed so haltingly as to be almost impossible projects for law reformers.
Activists face a wall of conservative resistance that, depending on your
point of view, impedes progress or stands strong against the vast, nearly
unbounded, duties-for-everyone encroachment of tort.' This opposition
takes three distinct forms, which I call "paradoxes," in relation to the
general project of creating new causes of action and to the phrase "How
to Make a New Tort" in particular: first, the paradox of novelty ("new");
second, the tort paradox ("tort"); and third, the paradox of agency ("how
to make"). These aspects of conservatism illuminate what lies ahead for
law reformers who start from the contention that where there is a wrong
there ought to be a remedy at law.
II. The Paradox of Novelty
For centuries the common law has claimed that the identification of a
right, or perhaps a wrong, demands a remedy. Ubijus, ibi remedium goes
the maxim, in contrast to the reverse, attributed to "primitive law," that
"where there is a remedy, there is a right."' Scholarship of the early
twentieth century described the evolution of a writ-based remedial scheme
into the modem contention that wrongs imply remedies.' Yet study of
the formation of new torts shows the persistence of "primitive" sequencing.
Wrongs to many people do imply remedies, but the converse is still strong;
and writers who describe or form successful new causes of action make due
obeisance to causes of action framed in the past.
25. My colleague Steven Harris, co-Reporter for the revision of Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, reports a preference for contract rather than tort remedies among the constituencies
with whom he works, for reasons of predictability and manageability. See infra Part II; see also
William K. Jones, Product Defects Causing Commercial Loss: The Ascendancy of Contract Over Tort,
44 U. MMI L. REV. 731, 758 (1990) (noting that the economic-loss rule in products liability favors
the UCC approach rather than tort precepts). From the vantage point of reformers, this conservative
concern about manageability is formidable but not insurmountable, as one may see from the van-
quishing of UCC rules in favor of tort-based strict products liability. See DAVID A. FISCHEP &
WILIAM POWERS, JR., PRODUCTS LIABILITY: CASES AND MATERIALS 562 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that
strict liability circumvents many UCC restrictions on recovery).
26. BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 1520 (6th ed. 1990) (defining ubijus, ibi remedium and including
a comparison to "primitive law"). The maxim seems to have been formed in the early eighteenth
century; it was noted by Blackstone, see 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23 ("[Where
there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy ... whenever that right is invaded."), and by Chief
Justice Marshall, see Marbuy v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (quoting Blackstone).
27. See E.F. Albertsworth, Recognition of New Interests in the Law of Torts, 10 CAL. L. REV.
461, 461-62 (1922) (stating that the traditional sequence was remedy, duty, right, and interest, but that
today the pattern is reversed to interest, right, duty, and remedy); see also Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld,
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1923)
(contrasting the ancient notion that rights are embodied in corporeal things with the modem notion of
rights as abstract legal interests pertaining to things).
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In their retreat from novelty, successful new-tort advocates embrace
formalism: whenever possible they argue that their new tort derives natu-
rally from prior common-law rules. "It is time to recognize that the courts
have created a new tort," wrote William Prosser in the first sentence of his
article about intentional infliction of emotional distressl implying that
this new tort formed and grew without deliberate cultivation and (again
following formalism) presuming that law is found-through logic and
analysis-rather than asserted.29 Prosser argued that the action for inten-
tional infliction of mental suffering developed in a sequence: assault first,
as a medieval variant on trespass; next there developed nineteenth-century
actions for indignities inflicted by railroad employees on paying passengers;
finally, by 1897, came the realization that "outrage" rather than common-
carrier liability explained the expansion of this tort.' ° Formalist themes
like these-analogy, synthesis, small increments that move the law
forward-also pervade the official history of products liability as told by
Edward Levi in his paean to the common-law method.31 The framer of
a new tort can in this way deny novelty. He can claim merely to chronicle
a past and (at most) note the direction in which logic points.
For reformers who are forced into a more open declaration that they
are innovating, a related way to repudiate novelty is to maintain that one
is correcting and tinkering. The new tort advanced is not so much a new
creation as an adjustment to well-established law. For instance, in The
28. Prosser, supra note 2, at 874.
29. See Craig Joyce, Keepers of the Flame: Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (Fifth
Edition) and the Prosser Legacy, 39 VAND. L. REV. 851, 856-58 (1986) (book review) (crediting
Prosser for fashioning the neoformalist "response to Realism"). Other new-tort writers have com-
mented on the strength of formalism in the development of new torts. See Jason A. Lief, Note,
Insuring Domestic Tranquility Through Quieter Products: A Proposed Product-Nuisance Tort, 16
CARDoZO L. REv. 595, 642-43 (1994) (arguing that the new tort of product nuisance is not new but
stems from invasion of privacy theories). Lief has noted that Chief Justice Coke (1552-1634) "was
reluctant to admit that law could be made, or even changed" because "[i]t existed already." Id. at 630
n.189. The right to privacy as posited by Warren and Brandeis is a partial exception to this tendency
toward formalism. See infra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
30. See Prosser, supra note 2, at 878 & n.22, 879-87 (citing Spade v. Lynn& B.R. Co., 47 N.E.
88 (Mass. 1897)). For early indications that mental suffering occasioned by outrageous conduct was
compensable and tracing the development of the tort, see generally Calvert Magruder, Mental and
Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L. REV. 1033 (1936) (explaining the emergence
of mental suffering as actionable and presenting caselaw that developed liability for breach of mental
peace). Both Prosser and Magruder neglect the admiralty case of Chamberlain v. Chandler, 5 F. Cas.
413 (C.C.D. Mass. 1823) (No. 2,575), where Justice Story awarded $400 to a woman passenger and
her husband for the "habitual obscenity, harsh threats, and immodest conduct" of a ship captain. Id.
at 414-15. Chamberlain, whose facts are shrouded in nineteenth-century evasion, appears to rely on
the passage contract between the parties: "the wrongs complained of are gross ill-treatment and
misconduct in the course of the voyage, while on the high seas, by the master, in breach of the
stipulations necessarily implied in his contract." Id. at 413. I am indebted to Professor David
Robertson for alerting me to this case.
31. See EDWARD H. LEv, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 10-27 (First Phoenix ed.,
Phoenix Books 1961) (1949).
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Right to Privacy,32 a new-tort landmark, Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis do not entirely want credit for novelty. Warren and Brandeis
repeatedly assert the ancient pedigree of their new tort.3 Similarly,
during the writing of Section 402A of the Restatement, the newness of
strict products liability was downplayed; Prosser contended variously that
the new section was a simple extension of warranty protection to nonprivy
purchasers of goods' and a summary of existing law." Both claims
look dubious, especially in hindsight. 6 A few exceptions exist to the rule
that emendation rather than novelty is the winning strategy when packaging
a new tort. Spoliation, a new tort not identified with the academy, was
proclaimed with full cymbal clashes by the California Court of Appeal.37
More often, however, judges firmly decline implicit or explicit invitations
to create new torts;38 this reticence has been shared, perhaps instinctively,
by academic reformers.39
32. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
33. Id. at 193-95, 204-05, 207-10 (presenting common-law cases that implicitly recognize an
intangible property right in personal privacy).
34. See JANE STAPLETON, PRODUCT LIABILITY 26 (1994).
35. See George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 514 (1985) (noting Prosser's
citation of early cases ostensibly supporting his claim of a trend toward strict liability in favor of the
ultimate consumer).
36. See id. at 515 (opining that if Prosser indeed believed in such limited scope of the rule, he
"obtained in Section 402A a legal standard far different from what he expected").
37. See Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 832 (Ct. App. 1984) (asserting that the law
of torts is not static and that a new tort "may be appropriate to cover the intentional spoliation of
evidence"). Fanfare also accompanied the holding of Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 106 N.E.2d 742,
743 (Ill. App. Ct. 1952), even though the tort there, invasion of privacy, was no longer a new idea.
38. I found countless refusals in recent judicial opinions. Some federal judges modestly note that
they are not competent to declare new torts. See Great Central Ins. Co. v. Insurance Servs. Office,
Inc., 74 F.3d 778, 785-86 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.) ("[W]hat Great Central really wants ...
is for us to create in the name of Illinois law a new tort .... We keep warning the bar that a plaintiff
who needs a common law departure or innovation to win should bring his suit in state court rather than
in federal court."); City of Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 994 F.2d 112, 129 (3d Cir. 1993)
(Cowen, J.) ("We once again refuse to articulate a new tort principle under Pennsylvania law."). Other
cases just say no. See CMI, Inc. v. Intoximeters, Inc., 918 F. Supp. 1068, 1079-80 (W.D. Ky. 1995),
appeal dismissed, 95 F.3d 1168 (1996) (refusing to adopt the tort of intentional interference with the
performance of a contract); Jones v. BP Oil Co., 632 So. 2d 435, 439 (Ala. 1993) (declining to recog-
nize a tort for negligence in implementing a corporate reorganization plan that resulted in the dismissal
of an at-will employee); Mack v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 880 P.2d 1173, 1177 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1994) (holding that the employer had no duty to an at-will employee to exercise reasonable care
in implementing a reorganization plan); Macias v. State, 897 P.2d 530, 540 (Cal. 1995) (refusing to
impose on an insecticide manufacturer a duty to disseminate health warnings when governmental entities
using the product were giving defective warnings); White v. State, 929 P.2d 396 (Wash. 1997)
(rejecting a proposed new tort of "wrongful transfer"); see also Daniel J. Bussel, Liability for
Concurrent Breach of Contract, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 97, 109 (1995) (describing the effort of the
Minnesota Supreme Court to "clarify" that it had not created a new tort for negligent breach of con-
tract, but rather that it had merged joint-and-several liability into contracts doctrine when joint breaches
of independent contracts combine to cause indivisible harm).
39. See supra notes 32-35.
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Successful new-tort creators further distance themselves from novelty
by avoiding references to a new class of victims or non-traditional values.
If a remedy follows from a right, as the modernists like to say, then one
might expect the law review literature to have paved the way for new torts
by detailing the unredressed harms of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, invasion of privacy, product-related injury, and wrongful dis-
charge. But it is only the last tort that has provoked any such literature,
and not by coincidence, wrongful discharge is the most precarious, the
least firmly fixed, of the four successful new torts.' Novelty suffers
further disdain in the values that advocate-writers claim lie behind their
innovations: the more traditional and conservative these values are, the
better they support the new tort.41
IH. The Tort Paradox
Newness, I have suggested, is a burden to new tort creators. And, as
a description of an area of the law, tort is a relatively new term.4' To
many, tort connotes expansion, unpredictable outcomes, and redistribution
of power, while contract and property come with a veneer of tradition and
continuity. Just as they dodge the novelty bullet, then, successful creators
40. California established an expansiveprecedent for wrongful discharge. See Tameny v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1333-37 (Cal. 1980) (holding that an employee's discharge should be
barred if terminating the employee would frustrate public policy). The California Supreme Court has
since retreated from Tameny's broad scope. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373,379-80
(Cal. 1988) (holding that no public interest exists to stop the discharge of an employee who disclosed
that his employerhad been embezzling). See also Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections
in an At-Will World, 74 TEXAS L. REv. 1655, 1669-87 (1996) (describing inroads on wrongful dis-
charge actions arising from the continued presumption of at-will employment). Invasion of privacy has
been proclaimed dead or mortally wounded. See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 365, 362-65
(suggesting that it is time to "give up the efforts at resuscitation" of the invasion of privacy tort). It
continues to live in various incarnations, however. See Susan M. Gilles, Promises Betrayed: Breach
of Confidence as a Remedyfor lnvasion of Privacy, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1995) (suggestingbreach
of confidence as an alternative to the invasion of privacy tort).
41. In his study of how the wrongful-dischargetort developed, Cornelius Peck writes that the con-
servative tradition challenged by the cause of action-employment at will-lacked a solid foundation
in common law and that because neither employment at will nor wrongful discharge was much more
venerable or novel than the other, the new tort was able to gain much-needed ground. See Peck, supra
note 13, at 724. The seminal article on wrongful discharge, Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will
vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. Rsv.
1404 (1967), called for a new tort remedy but invoked a host of traditions and conservative approaches
to the injustice identified. See id. at 1414, 1423-25, 1433 (explaining that his proposed remedy for
abusive discharge has parallels in the abuse-of-process tort action and in cases allowing recovery for
interference by a third party with the at-will employment relationship and suggesting that the remedy
would best be administered by established civil rights and employment practices commissions).
42. See KJEEON ET AL., supra note 3, at I ("Not until yesterday, as legal generations go, did torts
achieve recognition as a distinct branch of the law."). The first torts treatise was published in 1859,
the first casebook in 1874. See David W. Leebron, The Right to Privacy's Place in the Intellectual
History of Tort Law, 41 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 769, 772-73 (1991). Prior to the mid-nineteenth
century, "tort law was conceived of and practiced as a collection of unrelated writs." Id. at 770.
Texas Law Review [Vol. 75:1539
of new torts dodge the concept of tor 3 and, whenever possible, rely on
older common-law vehicles, especially contract and property." The
fluidity of these labels, pointed out twenty-five years ago by Calabresi and
Melamed,45 gives reformers room to maneuver.' When they can avoid
a tarring by the broad brush of torts, reformers make gains against conser-
vative resistance.
Contract and property rationales help the new-tort reform effort
immensely, and successful innovators take pains to find them. All four of
the new-tort successes owe debts to contract or property rationales.
Prosser was lucky to have an obvious contract antecedent for strict prod-
ucts liability,47 and he made more luck for himself by identifying a
contract theme for the new tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.48 Warren and Brandeis wrote that property, having already
expanded to cover "works of literature and art, goodwill, trade secrets and
trademarks," ought to take the "inevitable" next step and protect a person's
privacy when they argued, inter alia, that a chorine had a right not to be
photographed unexpectedly while wearing a revealing costume-property,
not the autonomy and dignity honored by tort, was said to be at stake.49
43. An almost whimsical example is provided in Jeremiah Smith, Torts Without Particular Names,
69 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 114-15 (1921) (observing that the phrase "Disparagement of Title" appears to
be winning out over "Slander of Title").
44. See infra notes 47-52, 61-74 and accompanying text.
45. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1089-93 (1972) (articulating a
unified concept of legal "entitlement" which embraces relationships traditionally analyzed in separate
subject areas such as property and torts).
46. See generally Frank I. Michelman, Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on
Calabresi's Costs, 80 YALE LJ. 647 (1971) (exploring the line between property and tort conceptions
of pollution and nuisance); Eileen A. Scallen, Promises Broken vs. Promises Betrayed: Metaphor,
Analogy, and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 897, 900 n.9 (collecting numerous
examples of contract-related injuries now redressed by tort actions).
47. See Prosser, Assault, supra note 13, at 1127 (proclaiming an assault on the "citadel" of privity
of contract with the statement that "[i]f warranty is a matter of tort as well as contract, and if it can
arise without any intent to make it a matter of contract, then it should need no contract; and it may
arise and exist between parties who have not dealtwith one another"); William L. Prosser, The Implied
Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv. 117, 124, 167-68 (1943) (defining the contract-
based implied warranty of merchantable quality, but noting that it was idle to inquire whether liability
was grounded in contract or tort because it partakes of the nature of both and in either case equates to
liability without fault).
48. See Prosser, supra note 2, at 881-82 (identifying "implied contract" as one of the bases more
timorous courts have rested their decisions upon rather than the intentional infliction of mental
suffering). In this piece, Prosser adverts to contract as a doctrinal label covering actions for outrage
that ought to be stripped away as obsolete and fictitious. See id. Contract antecedents, though
necessary to the statement of many new torts, are often disparaged as inadequate. On this point in the
context of invasion of privacy, see infra note 50. I am grateful to Keeton Symposium participants
David Anderson, for his thoughts on the subject, and David Owen, for naming this phenomenon: "the
paradox within the paradox."
49. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 32, at 204-06.
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Warren and Brandeis also acknowledged their debt to contract, while
claiming that the right to privacy had outgrown its contract heritage.' In
her recent review of the privacy tort, Susan Gilles proposed to shore it up
with a contract analogy-a tort for breach of confidence.51  Finally,
wrongful discharge was identified as a breach of contract first, emerging
as a tort several years later.52
The semisuccessful tort of spoliation relies on a host of other
categories of law. Destruction of evidence may be prevented or remedied
by rules of evidence such as the spoliation inference, which allows the
factfinder to draw an unfavorable inference against a spoliating litigant;53
rules of civil procedure, including Rule 37 of the Federal Rules and the
"inherent power" of federal courts to regulate litigation;S4 professional
responsibility tenets; 5 statutory and constitutional constraints on
prosecutors;56 and obstruction-of-justice statutes.57 In Smith v. Superior
Court,58 the California spoliation case, the court worked with contract-like
facts: the parties had had an understanding that the defendant would pre-
serve certain materials to be used as evidence at trial, and later the
defendant violated this agreement.59 Several judicial opinions after Smith
preferred to think of spoliation as a breach of contract,' and the
50. See id. at 208-12. For example, the authors argued, breach of contract worked fine in cases
involving unwanted distribution or publication of photographs back in the era when photography
required "sitting" and could not be done surreptitiously. Photographic technology now demands a
broader rationale, the authors wrote. Id. at 211. Similarly, the law might imply a promise not to dis-
close the private letters one solicits and receives, but such a promise could not bind a third party who
acquires a copy of such a letter without permission. See id. at 211-12.
51. See Gilles, supra note 40, at 56-60.
52. See Petermann v. International Bd. of Teamsters, Local 396, 344 P.2d 25, 27-28 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1959) (proclaiming that an employer's breach of an employment contract may result in
damages if the discharge was not in good faith and frustrates public policy).
53. See Lawrence Solum & Stephen Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the
Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1087-94 (1987) (relating the elements and effect of the
spoliation inference as a method of inhibiting the destruction of evidence).
54. See id. at 1094-100 (elaborating on civil discovery sanctions as a method of controlling the
destruction of evidence).
55. See id. at 1125-35 (discussing the law regarding attorney participation in destroying evidence).
56. See id. at 1118-25 (noting the "special problem" of destruction of evidence by police and
prosecutors).
57. See id. at 1106-18 (discussing the ramifications of criminal sanctions for destroying evidence).
58. 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Ct. App. 1984).
59. See id. at 831 (relating that the defendant had destroyed, lost, or transferred the physical
evidence, making it impossible for the plaintiff's experts to inspect and test it).
60. See, e.g., Wilson v. Beloit Corp., 921 F.2d 765, 767 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that only the
existence of an agreement to preserve evidence gives rise to a duty to preserve evidence); La Raia v.
Superior Court, 722 P.2d 286 (Ariz. 1986) (finding Smith inapposite); Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573
So. 2d 24, 26-27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing a cause of action in either tort or contract
for spoliation of evidence, depending upon whether the duty breached was imposed by agreement or
by law); Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177, 1182, 1181-83 (Kan. 1987)
(distinguishing the plaintiff's claim from Smith on the ground that "no special circumstance or
relationships" existed that would create a duty to preserve evidence).
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California court itself may have started from that premise. Nontort
protections continue to help justify the existence of a tort of spoliation.
The tort paradox prompts the supposition that a number of new torts
may have, in the Jim Crow locution, "passed;" in other words, new causes
of action may have succeeded because they escaped the menacing tort label
and appeared to be protections of contract or property rights rather than
new torts. The zone between contract and tort provides particularly effec-
tive cover. Contract scholars like to complain that tort-thinking has
engulfed and devoured their discipline," and the successful new tort of
strict products liability is only one example of this conquest.62 But tort
need not, at least in theory, be ascendant always. Other possibilities exist,
including contracts being dominant (such that the tort is barely discerned)
and equal coexistence between the two doctrines.
Examples of the muting of torts are, by hypothesis, hard to detect.
One relatively visible example is in insurance law: most states allow a
claim against an insurer for bad-faith refusal to provide benefits under an
insurance policy.' I have found that this cause of action does not come
readily to mind as a new tort except among those who specialize in insur-
ance or commercial law. Its status seems peculiarly poised between tort
and something else. While some courts speak frankly about the tort of bad
faith, many prefer to endorse an action that is limited in some way, and
for this purpose a focus on contract doctrine-or on the insurance contract
itself-is expedient. Even when judges believe that the contracts label
would keep damages too low to compensate plaintiffs for the harms of bad
faith,' they find the contract cloak reassuring, a device to keep
61. The classics are P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 571-79 (1979)
(analyzing the decline of free choice in contract theory and suggesting that benefit-based and reliance-
based liabilities are more in line with current paternalistic social philosophy) and GRANT GILMORE, THE
DEATH OF CONTRACT 96 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 1995). See also Scallen, supra note 46, at 900-01
n.9 (noting the various methods by which courts and commentators have expanded contract liability
through tort sanctions).
62. See Grant Gilmore, Products Liability: A Commentary, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 103, 115-16
(1970) (pointing to the rise of "Products Liability" within the domain of sales law as only one example
of the "reversal of risks ... [that] has been going on all over the place" in the law).
63. See WILLIAM M. SHERNOFF ET AL., INSURANCE BAD FAITH LITIoATION § 2.01 at 2-2 (1990).
64. See Timberlake Constr. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 71 F.3d 335, 340 (10th Cir. 1995)
(stating the Oklahoma tort of bad faith by an insurer); Quick v. National Auto Credit, 65 F.3d 741,
744-47 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1034 (1996) (stating Missouri's tort of bad faith
failure to settle); Best Place, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Am. Ins. Co., 920 P.2d 334, 346 (Haw. 1996)
(finding an independenttort cause of action for an insurer's breach of the duty of good faith); Guaranty
Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Potter, 912 P.2d 267, 272 (Nev. 1996) (upholding a finding against an insurer for
tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith).
65. Tort rules permit wider recovery, sometimes allowing compensatory damages for mental suf-
fering and medical expenses. See SHERNOFF ET AL., supra note 63, § 7.0311]. Occasionally punitive
damages are available. See id. at § 8.01. Cases where courts deemed contract damages too low
include the landmark Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1041-42 (Cal. 1973)
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entitlements less visible.' Rather than proclaim a social wrong-the evil
of bad faith-judges have generally hewed to the insurance contracts at
issue in the cases while granting themselves a bit of tort-like leeway as to
remedy.67 Contract traditions thus lend old-fashioned respectability to a
partially revealed new tort.
Property traditions also dress up claims that would otherwise have to
face the world in the less protective garb of tort. For example, property
law recognizes implied warranties of fitness and habitability in residential
property68-a large set of entitlements that would have looked more radi-
cal if they had been proposed as new torts. Courts have much freedom to
move in this area. In Miller v. Christian,' an appeal to the Third
Circuit from the Virgin Islands, the appellate court had a statutory duty to
turn to the Restatements for guidance in the absence of governing local
law.7 With a little help from the Restatement of Torts, the Miller court
read the Restatement of Property to allow a claim for personal-property
damages against a landlord based on his breach of the implied warranty of
habitability,7 even though the Restatement of Property's support for this
action is far from explicit. In California, the implied warranty of habit-
ability supported a holding of strict landlord liability for latent premises
defects.72 Other courts have helped veil this quasi-new tort in the
(allowing a claim for plaintiff's distress even though the insurer's conduct may not have been
"extreme" or "outrageous"). See also Capstick v. Allstate Ins. Co., 998 F.2d 810, 821 (10th Cir.
1993) (noting that "bad faith" cases against insurers may involve nominal contract damages and
significant egregious behavior worthy of punitive damages); Hall v. Modem Woodmen of Am., 882
F. Supp. 830, 832 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (noting that without tort-damages rules, the amount in controversy
would be too low for diversity jurisdiction).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Benson, 67 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting the essential
.contractual character" of bad-faith actions); Pen Coal Corp. v. William H. McGee & Co., 903 F.
Supp. 980, 983 (S.D. W. Va. 1995) (preferring use of a contract designation for choice-of-law
analysis); Pierce v. International Ins. Co., 671 A.2d 1361, 1367 & n.6 (Del. 1996) (surveying other
states' caselaw before choosing the contract rubric). One recent state supreme court case that decided
to accept the tort label did so with a show of reluctance, noting the particular advantages of a tort
approach in third-party insurance cases. See Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 1092, 1095
(Ariz. 1996) (alluding to "the almost even split in jurisdictions regarding which rubric best fits bad faith
claims").
67. See Daniel S. Bopp, Tort and Contract in Bad Faith Cases: Is the Honeymoon Over?, 59 DEF.
COUNS. J. 524, 529 (1992) (referring to inroads into the "contract haven"); id. at 529-30 (describing
the compromise approach of "Bad Faith as Contract, but with Broadened Remedies"). See also id. at
534 (noting that some courts accept the tort label but hold plaintiffs to the contract statute of
limitations).
68. See, e.g., RESTATEmENr (SECOND) OF PROPERTY §§ 5.1-5.6 (1977) (discussing landlord and
tenant duties).
69. 958 F.2d 1234 (3d Cir. 1992).
70. Id. at 1237 (citing V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 4 (1984)).
71. Id. at 1238-91.
72. See Becker v. IRM Corp., 698 P.2d 116, 117 (Cal. 1985) (reversing a lower court ruling that
'a landlord is not liable to a tenant for a latent defect of the premises absent concealment of a known
danger or an expressed contractual or statutory duty to repair"); see also Johnson v. Scandia Assocs.,
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language of contract and the rubric of property.' A rather cryptic
property-law promise thus contains the powers of a new tort, as well as the
"doctrinal camouflage"74 needed to conceal those powers.
IV. The Paradox of Agency
A law review article on the new tort of spoliation seeks to assist state
supreme court judges who are uncertain about whether to accept it.
According to the author, Terry Spencer, the decision of whether to adopt
a new cause of action is, or ought to be, rationalist, future-looking, and
aggregative, like the Hand formula-that is, a comparison of costs versus
benefits, based on an estimate of the incentives that the new tort would
foster.7' Spencer enumerates some of the costs and benefits of a spolia-
tion tort and sketches a design for future empirical research that could
improve the analysis.76 This utilitarian approach is absolutely contrary to
the life-history of successful new torts. As previously mentioned, new-tort
formation looks backward, not forward. Furthermore, whereas Spencer
presumes that new torts become effective by the design of policymakers
using the litigation process,77 new torts have been successful only
inasmuch as they can be portrayed as independent of individual human
creation.
The master portraiter and veiled agent of American tort history was,
of course, William Prosser, whose approach to the creation of new torts
outmaneuvered all three of the conservative paradoxes, most strikingly the
paradox of agency. In his scholarship and in the records of his work at the
American Law Institute, Prosser emerges consistently as a man without a
plan to leave an idiosyncratic imprint on tort law. To Prosser, changes in
641 N.E.2d 51 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (using the implied warranty of habitability to support an action
for personal injury caused by latent premises defects).
73. Like the claim for bad faith, implied warranty of habitability is often characterized by courts
as a contract-tort hybrid. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Superior Court, 800 P.2d 585, 587-88
(Ariz. 1990); Elizabeth N. v. Riverside Group, Inc., 585 So. 2d 376, 378-81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1991); Ellis v. Robert C. Morris, Inc., 513 A.2d 951, 955 (N.H. 1986). Again, strict adherence to
contract is restrictive because of the damages rules. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. But
even when seen in terms of contract, the implied warranty of habitability recognizes wrongs, rights,
and remedies that have much in common with tort actions.
74. Peck, supra note 13, at 719.
75. Spencer, supra note 2, at 61-71.
76. Id. at 61-64. For example, Spencer says that spoliation is a frequent occurrence; one estimate,
by Charles Nesson, suggests that destruction of evidence occurs in a large percentage of civil cases.
See id. at 64 (citing Charles R. Nesson, Incentives to Spoliate Evidence in Civil Litigation: The Need
for Vigorous JudicialAction, 13 CAmDozo L. REv. 793,793 (1991)). Given the scope of the problem,
one could devise a study comparing states that accept the tort with states of similar characteristics that
do not, measuring the deterrent effect of a tort remedy in the jurisdiction. See id.
77. See id. at 45-55 (chronicling several state courts' recognition of the tort of intentional or
negligent spoliation).
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tort law had virtually no role to play in empowering the disenfranchised,
identifying new victims, telling untold stories, or shifting any balance of
power in any direction. By his own lights Prosser was not a political
agent, 78 and so his proposals were seen as undirected and imminent.
A conservative demeanor charmed away a great deal of conservative
resistance. In his writings Prosser looked at claimants with a jaundiced
eye. He piled additional scorn on a mocked old woman, 79 trivialized
sexual assault,' snickered at American Indians,"1 impugned the motives
and testimony of plaintiffs,' and took domestic violence lightly.'
Readers could be sure that any new torts advocated did not originate in a
bleeding heart. This posture served to deny both novelty and agency.
The Restatement project gave Prosser additional power to avoid the
paradox of agency and preempt conservative criticism. Prosser modified
an earlier version of the emotional distress tort in a conservative direction.
When the American Law Institute had originally accepted the new tort in
1948, it did not make outrageousness an element; to cover some of the
same ground, the Restatement allowed a defense of privilege."
Unilaterally determining that without the element of outrageousness, the
tort would expand too quickly, Prosser added this element to the plaintiff's
prima facie case and moved the privilege issue to the comments.' When
78. See William L. Prosser, On Political Questions, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 409 (1948) (reflecting on
his refusal to use his position to endorse a political cause).
79. See William L. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAL. L. REV. 40, 51 (calling an emotional-
distress plaintiff "an eccentric and mentally deficient old maid").
80. See WiLLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 95 (8th ed. 1988) ("On a
park bench in the moonlight, a young man informs a girl that he is going to kiss her. She says and
does nothing, and he kisses her. Is he liable for battery?"). A later edition of the casebook sanitized
this illustration. See JOHN W. WADE ET AL., TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 91 (9th ed. 1994)
(replacing the unnamed recipient of the unsolicited kiss with the man's fiancde). Prosser also enjoyed
a good laugh at Dickinson v. Scruggs, 242 F. 900 (6th Cir. 1917), in which the female plaintiff
"accepted the invitation [to illicit sexual intercourse] and then sued for the insult." Prosser, supra note
79, at 46 n.33. See also Carl Tobias, Gender Issues and the Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz Torts
Casebook, 18 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 495, 522 (1988) (criticizing note materials in Prosser's case-
book as "almost prurient" and degrading to women).
81. See William L. Prosser, Lighthouse No Good, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 257, 257 (1948) (faulting
a West Coast Indian's failure to follow English grammar rules).
82. See Presser, supra note 79, at 51 ("The pot of gold came at last.., but only to her heirs.").
In another article, Presser related a case in which he had represented a defendant against one plaintiff,
"a little Swedish housewife," who had tripped in her kitchen and "ended up on the floor... with
tomato juice down her neck, jello in her hair, a fractured hip, lacerations, contusions and abrasions,
a great deal of mental suffering, and, believe it or not, a miscarriage!" William L. Presser, Modem
Trends in the Law of Torts, 16 NEv. ST. B.J. 51, 52-53 (1951).
83. See Tobias, supra note 80, at 513, 522-23 (noting Prosser's omission of wife battering in his
treatment of battery and "discipline" and his characterization of husbands' privilege to beat their wives
as a "gentle rule").
84. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (Supp. 1948).
85. See Mark P. Gergen, A Grudging Defense of the Role of the Collateral Torts in Wrongful
Termination Litigation, 74 TEXAS L. REv. 1693, 1706 (1996) (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF
TORTS § 46 cmt. g (1964) and id. § 46 reporter's note (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1957)).
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strict products liability began to take shape as a new tort in the middle of
the century, the Restatement (Second) gave Prosser another opportunity to
downplay his agency and portray strict products liability as part of the
emerging new common law, even though only a few state courts had
accepted the cause of action at the time. 6 Restatement work as a general
matter can provide cover for activists who seek to disclaim agency,' and
Prosser exploited this cover to help build three successful new torts.
The Right to Privacy looks like an exception to the paradox of agency,
but even this new-tort proposal that is so famously identified with the
designs of its two authors can be seen as a work offered in partial
humility."8 Warren and Brandeis identified a wrong and thus a right, "the
right [of the individual] to be let alone." 9 But the new tort of privacy
was hardly their creation alone.9' Prior caselaw had recognized a right
to privacy in connection with property interests. 91  Later doctrine-
builders-notably the ever-present impresario William Prosser-shaped the
right to privacy into four distinct new tort actions. 92
Where Warren and Brandeis had to focus on the specifics of their new
cause of action, moreover, they retreated into vagueness. As James Barron
points out, the aspect of privacy that mattered most to Warren and
Brandeis-the right to keep personal information out of the newspapers-is
both inconsistent with the principle of a free press and unattractive to the
courts in practice. Moreover, the remedy that Warren and Brandeis
proposed-more publicity in the form of a lawsuit-"inhibits the very
individuals to be protected." 93 Other writers who admire the article
condemn it for its sloppy doctrine.' But doctrine was never its point; the
86. See Priest, supra note 35, at 514 (stating that Prosser cited 40 cases to support his claim that
strict products liability was part of newly emerging common law).
87. I have developed this theme at greater length in Anita Bernstein, RestatementRedux, 48 VAND.
L. REV. 1663, 1679-80 (1995).
88. See James H. Barron, Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890):
DemystifyingaLandmark Citation, 13 SuFFoLKU. L. REv. 875, 911 (1979) (noting Brandeis's modest
assessment of the article by citing a letter written on Nov. 29, 1890 from Louis D. Brandeis to Alice
Goldmark).
89. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 32, at 193.
90. "Although the two men are regarded as fathers of the right of privacy, their paternity may well
be in name only." Barron, supra note 88, at 884.
91. See Leebron, supra note 42, at 777-78 (noting a Michigan Supreme Court case, DeMay v.
Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881), in which the plaintiff won damages because the defendant
witnessed her in childbirth, and a Supreme Court decision that invalidated the required production of
private papers, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), rev'd on other grounds, 387 U.S. 294
(1967)).
92. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652 A-E (1976) (describing the four new torts);
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960) (listing the four new tort actions:
intrusion, public disclosure of private facts, false light in the public eye, and appropriation).
93. Barron, supra note 88, at 880-81.
94. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social
Change, 1890-1990, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1133, 1135 (1992) (suggesting that the approach taken by
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authors seemed almost bored by the idea of a tort claim. Eschewing any
ambition to reallocate power in favor of a wronged class of plaintiffs,
Warren and Brandeis offered The Right to Privacy as a meditation-or
"something of a lawyer's catharsis," as Clark Havighurst wrote95-on the
nature of basic liberties rather than as a contribution to torts.' The
article explored social change and the interests of one class in particular,'
and it did not insist on its own new-tort originality. By demurring to
pertinent questions of tort theory and practice, Warren and Brandeis were
able to avoid the penalties associated with new-tort agency.
For those readers willing to accept the MacKinnon-Dworkin anti-
pornography statute as a new tort,9" the story of this crusade illustrates
how the paradox of agency can kill a proposed cause of action. In the offi-
cial story, the antipornography statute fell victim to First Amendment con-
straint rather than to any paradox: the statute suppressed the right to free
speech and promoted a state orthodoxy, wrote Judge Frank Easterbrook
of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,' and the Supreme Court
agreed." By contrast, the paradox of agency points to the fame,
scrutiny, and activism that accompanied Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea
Dworkin. This agency was a central obstacle to their proposed tort.
Consider the new tort. Blaming pornography for a host of injuries,
the statute provided a right of action against filmmakers, distributors,
exhibitors, and persons "trafficking in pornography" as well as direct
perpetrators of harm such as assault and battery. °" All actions were to
be brought by wronged individuals; MacKinnon and Dworkin stood ada-
mantly against letting the state initiate prosecution and refused to write new
crimes." In spuming the power of criminal law, MacKinnon and
Warren and Brandeis in analyzing a right of privacy is inapplicable to modem society); Zimmerman,
supra note 14, at 293 (noting the conflict between the right of privacy and the protection of freedom
of speech).
95. Clark C. Havighurst, Foreword, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 251, 251 (1966).
96. See Barron, supra note 88, at 884 (explaining that Warren and Brandeis believed the right to
privacy was implicit in the common law); Leebron, supra note 42, at 779-80 (criticizing Edward
Bloustein's assertion that Warren and Brandeis thought of privacy exclusively in terms of torts).
97. See Bezanson, supra note 94, at 1139 ("In 1890, the idea of privacy, as expressed by Warren
and Brandeis, had a distinctly class-based character. It focused on the 'problem' of access by the lower
classes of society to information about the upper classes.").
98. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
99. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd mem., 475
U.S. 1001 (1986).
100. See Hudnut v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (mem.), affg 771 F.2d
323 (7th Cir. 1985).
101. See Brest & Vandenberg, supra note 16, at 619.
102. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DiscouRsES ON LIFE AND LAW
163, 192 (1987); Brest & Vandenberg, supra note 16, at 616 ("[MacKinnon and Dworkin] believe...
[a] civil action, controlled by the plaintiff herself rather than a public prosecutor, offered the possibility
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Dworkin built-or at least tolerated-a big escape hatch for pornographers:
civil juries, who tend to favor defendants much more than do criminal
juries, 1°3 would presumably find many claims dubious.1" Thus the
statute was hardly the second coming of Anthony Comstock in his prime.
Especially if one puts aside as rhetorical the statute's preamble-"civil
inequality of the sexes," "exploitation and subordination," "bigotry and
contempt"1 05-what remains of the ordinance is an approximate parallel
to common-law mainstays like defamation and deceit and to newer actions
like intentional infliction of emotional distress."°6 Unquestionably, these
traditional torts collide with a strong version of free speech rights," 7 but
judges who preside over this intersection have usually seen their task as
having to meld the two sets of interests rather than to extinguish the
tort.
108
of putting state power in women's hands and simultaneously offering relief to individuals and moving
toward sex equality.").
103. See Richard W. Wright, The Tort Liability System 18-19 (1996) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Texas Law Review) (gathering empirical data on jury verdicts).
104. Gender roles within the jury may devalue women's claims. See Kent Greenfield, Our
Conflicting Judgments About Pornography, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1197, 1201 (1994) (noting juries'
indifference to the subordination of women); Nancy S. Marder, Note, Gender Dynamics and Jury
Deliberations, 96 YALE L.J. 593 (1987) (describing the tendency for women to participate less than
men injury deliberations, and consequently, for verdicts to fail to represent female jurors' concerns).
Of course, defendants are burdened by the existence of a cause of action long before any lawsuit
reaches a jury. Steven Brill, who in his own words is "not someone who instinctively sides with
advantaged, deep-pocketed defendants," describes a litigation explosion from his vantage point:
I see [the impact of the meritless lawsuit explosion] as a libel defendant who has never
lost a libel suit or even had one get as far as a trial, but who has become so weary of the
cost of winning that I'd gladly give up many of my First Amendment defenses in such
cases in exchange for a rule that says that if we get it wrong and it damaged someone, we
pay those damages and if not, they pay us for our legal fees.
Steven Brill, Paula Jones: There Ought to Be a Law, WASH. POST, June 5, 1994, at C7.
105. See Brest & Vandenberg, supra note 16, at 619.
106. See generally Edith L. Pacillo, Note, Getting a Feminist Foot in the Courtroom Door: Media
Liability for Personal Injury Caused by Pornography, 28 SuFFoLK U. L. REV. 123, 148-49 (1994)
(advocating that the "risk-utility test" applied in negligent publication cases should also apply to review
of civil liability claims against pornographersto "provide_] an equitable and flexible means of balancing
free-speech concerns with a woman's right to recover for bodily injury").
107. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (tempering the intentional-
infliction tort with the First Amendment); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
(reconciling the common-law tort of defamation with freedom of the press); Winter v. G.P. Putnam's
Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting the conflict between the misrepresentation tort and the
First Amendment).
108. Portions of the antipornography statute relating to directly caused harm could have been
salvaged, for instance, from an opinion striking down the "trafficking" provision, which permitted any
woman to play private attorney general. On merging torts and the First Amendment, Braun v. Soldier
of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110 (1 th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the defendant's First Amendment
argument in a negligence action); Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975) (allowing
recovery for wrongful death following a negligent radio broadcast); and supra note 107. See also
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (holding that the First Amendment does not bar
a contract claim based on a betrayed promise not to publish an informant's identity).
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An uncommonly strong presence of agency overpowered the anti-
pornography statute. The courts and the public judged MacKinnon and
Dworkin radical and illiberal-a judgment that precluded a more measured
conclusion about their new cause of action. 1°9 To be sure, MacKinnon
and Dworkin would have it no other way. Their intention was to provoke,
to unleash, to destroy; successful new torts bend and accommodate, an
impossible posture for these activists.
The similar fate experienced by those activists who posited another
"too radical" new tort, an action for hate speech, when placed alongside
the fate of the four successful new torts, suggests that new torts are not
inherently too radical to be accepted; instead, new causes of action that
cannot defeat the three conservative paradoxes are judged too radical after
they fail. "Too radical," "too ideological," and "incompatible with the
First Amendment" are headstones over the graves of failed torts rather than
the causes of their death.110 These labels misdescribe the nature of
conservative resistance by emphasizing three things: affected constituencies,
right-remedy analysis, and an open attention to power that is alien to the
polite reticence of the common law. What cause of action could be more
radical than the four successful new torts, especially when considered
together? The four successes outline a transformative agenda. They
challenge power. They put weapons in the hands of racial minorities,1
109. This hostility spread away from the MacKinnon-Dworkin statute itself: feminist anti-censor-
ship groups that had mobilized against the statute after its enactment in Indianapolis helped to defeat
the Pornography Victims' CompensationAct of 1991, S. 1521, 102d Cong. (1991), a similar piece of
legislation introduced in the United States Senate in 1991. See Joan Kennedy Taylor, Does Sexual
Speech Harm Women? The Split Within Feminism, 5 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 49, 50-52 (1994)
(describing anticensorship feminists' role in defeating the Pornography Victims' Compensation Act
through public opposition).
110. My colleague Steven Heyman proposes an alternative cause-of-death explanation, following
the work of Robert Post: the pornography and hate-speech torts may have failed because they identify
group-based, rather than individual, injury. See Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law:
Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First Amendment, 76 CAL. L. REV. 297, 330, 334-35 (1988)
(asserting that the pornography tort advocated by MacKinnon and Dworkin was ultimately not adopted
because it conflicts with the established notion that the First Amendment protects the individual rather
than the group, whereas the limited success afforded the hate speech tort in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250 (1952), was due to the argument that group libel is merely a variant of individual defama-
tion). In other words, tort law aspires to a universalism and neutrality that are precluded by the sub-
grouping inherent in the two failed torts. While I acknowledge the appeal of this competing explana-
tion, I wonder whether "individual rights" and "group rights" are not conclusions like "too radical,"
rather than causes propter hoc. There is also some aggregation to be found in the successful new torts,
especially strict products liability (available only against certain types of defendants) and wrongful
discharge.
111. See, e.g., Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 468 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1970) (allowing an intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim based in part on racial epithets); Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc.,
833 P.2d 1218 (Okla. 1992) (upholding the nonstatutory, public policy wrongful discharge claim of an
employee who brought race discrimination and racially motivated retaliatory discharge complaints).
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women, 12  consumers," workers,1 4  and targets of harassment."5
Yet because the agents behind them kept their profile low, these new torts
developed without being seen as ideology and without providing a handy
human target for conservative attack."6
The paradox of agency indicates a pitfall for activists. Fearing the
radical label, they may be tempted to propose narrower, more conservative
formulations of failed causes of action. These concessions chase the too-
radical chimera and end up emphasizing the agency of the one making con-
cessions. By casting themselves as new-tort designers, activists affront
conservative resistance even when their proposals retreat from a radical
agenda.
This error is exemplified, I think, by John Nockleby's effort to rewrite
the tort of hate speech proposed about a decade earlier by Richard
Delgado." 7 The Nockleby version moves in a conservative direction: it
addresses only race-based threats of violence,"' not all "[l]anguage...
intended to demean through reference to race," as the Delgado version
112. See, e.g., Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1993) (using the strict
products liability doctrine to support expansive holdings on behalf of a pregnant plaintiff); Daily Times
Democrat Co. v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964) (approving liability against a newspaper on
invasion of privacy grounds for publishing a photograph of the plaintiff with her dress billowing over
her head); Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580 (Ariz. 1987) (allowing an intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim against an employer for sexual harassment by one employee against another);
Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680 (Cal. 1992) (allowing a "public policy" wrongful discharge claim
for a manager who had supported a coworker's sexual harassment complaint).
113. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) ("The
remedies of injured consumers ought not be made to depend upon the intricacies of the law of sales."
(quoting Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 F. 322, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1912)); Sutherland v. Kroger Co.,
110 S.E.2d 716 (W.Va. 1959) (allowing an invasion of privacy action by a customer whose bag was
searched in a store); Winkelman v. Beloit Mem'l Hosp., 483 N.W.2d 211 (Wis. 1992) (allowing, on
public policy grounds, a wrongful discharge action by an employeewho had refused to perform nursing
services for which she was not qualified)).
114. See, e.g., Kerr-Selgas v. American Airlines, Inc., 69 F.3d 1205 (1st Cir. 1995) (approving
retaliatory discharge and invasion of privacy claims that supported a large jury award for the plaintiff-
employee); Kisor v. Johns-ManvilleCorp., 783 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1986) (rejecting the manufacturer's
defense that it did not know the hazards of its asbestos product in a strict products-liability action by
an asbestos worker); Ali v. Douglas Cable Communications, 929 F. Supp. 1362 (D. Kan. 1996)
(denying the defendant-employer summary judgment on wrongful discharge and invasion of privacy
claims by employees whose phone calls at work were monitored).
115. See, e.g., Saville v. Houston County Healthcare Auth., 852 F. Supp. 1512, 1540-41 (M.D.
Ala. 1994) (holding that one employee's harassment of a fellow employee raised a jury question of an
invasion of privacy by the employer); Nader v. General Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970)
(allowing an invasion of privacy action for the general harassment of a private action by a corporation);
Laura Quackenbush, Note, Workers' Compensation Exclusivity and Wrongful Termination Tort
Damages: An Injurious Tug of War?, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1229, 1243 (1988) (noting a common thread
of harassment running through claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and wrongful
discharge).
116. See Bernstein, supra note 4, at 180-81 (discussingattentionto individualswithin law reform).
117. See Nockleby, supra note 15.
118. Seeid. at 707-08.
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did,119 and unlike some other versions of a hate speech tort, the Nockleby
tort would not require the plaintiff to be a member of a subordinated or
oppressed group: white persons could sue.1" Professor Nockleby char-
acterizes his retrenchment as necessary in light of the "significant
constitutional and practical considerations" of a hate speech tort."' My
argument, by contrast, identifies constitutional and practical considerations
as secondary to an earlier and more fundamental conservatism, expressed
particularly in the paradox of agency. If I am right, then conservative
resistance will not be mollified by such an effort to concede and compro-
mise. Nockleby, willing to surrender breadth in order to achieve accep-
tance, fails to part with that which weighs him down more than breadth:
his own role as agent. Put another way, although it may be necessary for
bold proposals to change into modest ones, this impulse toward modesty
is more fruitful when it focuses on reduced agency rather than reduced
scope.
V. Three New-Tort Proposals: Paradoxes in Action
What's new in new torts? In her pathbreaking 1993 article, Jane
Larson proposes that sexual fraud-telling lies to gain sex, and causing
damage thereby-ought to be actionable by the deceived, in the way that
commercial fraud is now actionable.1" A second new tort, also associ-
ated with feminism, proposes an action for sexual harassment independent
of civil rights statutes or traditional torts now used to remedy this
injury." These two examples come readily to the mind of a torts-and-
feminism writer asked to name a couple of inchoate new torts. To balance
this array of examples, I add a third proposal: the argument by Rory
Lancman that infringement of speech by private actors deserves redress by
119. Delgado, supra note 15, at 179.
120. Compare Nockleby, supra note 15, at 708 (arguing that such a tort should not be limited to
messages directed against historically oppressed groups because of the difficulty in determining which
groups have the right to claim subordinated status), with Matsuda, supra note 15, at 2361-62
(suggesting that expressions of hatred towards members of a dominantgroup should be exempt, because
these messages are fled to the structural dominance of that group in society).
121. Nockleby, supra note 15, at 713.
122. See Larson, supra note 22, at 453 (suggesting that the elements of fraudulent
misrepresentation be expanded to include liability for physical and emotional injury).
123. See Krista J. Schoenheider, Comment, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment in
the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1461, 1485-94 (1986) (advocating tort liability for unreasonable
interference with an individual employee's right to work in an environment free from sex-based intimi-
dation or hostility); see also Michael D. Vhay, Comment, The Harms of Asking: Towards a
Comprehensive Treatment of Sexual Harassment, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 328, 356-62 (1988) (arguing that
§ 48 of the Second Restatement be revised to remedy "advances in inappropriate contexts"). A conser-
vative version of a sexual harassment tort, which seems to give plaintiffs no more than what they
already have in § 46 of the Restatement, appears in Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex
Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 333, 362 (1990).
1997] 1559
Texas Law Review
a tort called "suppression."'" Because Lancman's thesis appears to
originate in the center-right of the political spectrum-his two examples of
suppression are the destruction of fourteen thousand copies of a student
newspaper by African-American activists and the shouting-down of Robert
Casey when he tried to give an anti-abortion speech'-a sample group
that includes the new tort of suppression may help test my conservative-
paradoxes theory more completely than would an all-feminist group. Of
these three proposals, sexual harassment as a new tort is best equipped to
oppose the paradoxes of novelty and agency, whereas sexual fraud and
suppression may expect to do better in the future vis-a-vis the tort paradox.
Larson and Lancman both admit the novelty and agency behind their
proposals. Their titles are plain. "Introducing the Tort of
Suppression,"" the second half of the Lancman title, announces a bold
departure from doctrinal infirmities of the past. Larson heralds novelty
with the phrase "feminist rethinking" in her title. 27 The famous
buzzword-"the F word,"128 "a dirty word," 2 9  a red-hot
signifier" 0°-shouts novelty and agency as clearly as Lancman's
"introducing," but with more provocation at stake, and this novelty is
amplified by the academic gerund "rethinking." When Prosser used the
phrase "a new tort" in one of his titles, he was quick to deny, in the first
sentence of the article, that he had engineered or invented this entity,'
and he never used the phrase again in a title. Here my purpose is not to
fault the assertion of novelty. One cannot fairly compare young contempo-
rary scholars to Prosser: Larson and Lancman compete for attention in a
bigger, more egalitarian, and more glutted law review market, one in
which bold contrarian departures attract readers. Prosser's formalism and
self-abnegation were not entirely his choice but also the rigid convention
of the time. Regardless of what occasioned his posture, however, Prosser
was able to avoid claiming novelty and agency as he fashioned new
124. See Lancman, supra note 2, at 243-44.
125. See id. at 223-24. Chicagoans will be reminded of the time that offended protestors forcibly
removed from the School of the Art Institute a painting that satirized former mayor Harold Washington.
Because the protestors were local aldermen, however, an action for damages was available under the
federal civil rights laws. See Matt O'Connor, Suit Ended on Picture of Washington, CHI. TRIB., Sept.
21, 1994, § 2, at 1.
126. Lancman, supra note 2, at 223.
127. Larson, supra note 22, at 374.
128. Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 3 n.1
(1988) (noting that Lucinda Finley compares the term feminism with "the F word").
129. Id. at 3.
130. See Susan Hardy Aiken et al., Trying Transformations: Curriculum Integration and the
Problem of Resistance, 12 SIGNS 255 (1987) (analyzing resistance within the academy to an integration
of feminist and traditional educators).
131. See Presser, supra note 2, at 874 ("It is time to recognize that the courts have created a new
tort.").
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torts," 2 and this small success of avoidance is necessary to the larger
success of the new tort.
In similar contrast to successful new-tort efforts, Lancman and Larson
see their first task as identifying a wrong and then tailoring their new-tort
remedy to this injury. Lancman begins his article by claiming that the
Daily Pennsylvanian student newspaper and former governor Casey each
suffered a wrong that is not adequately remedied by current tort
doctrine.133 Larson details the harm of sexual fraud with a reference to
victimized women: her article begins by quoting the lament of seduced-and-
abandoned Elvira, from Lorenzo Da Ponte's libretto Don Giovanni.34
Wrongs imply rights, which in turn imply remedies. This sequence, as
was mentioned, usually will not lead new torts to success. Speaking for
the silenced, Larson and Lancman end up underscoring not so much the
entitlements of new victims as the novelty of their claims.
The tort paradox also confounds the proposed new torts of suppression
and sexual fraud. In stressing ubijus, ibi remedium, Larson and Lancman
neglect more promising avenues. Sexual fraud has a contract argument to
develop, while suppression ought to work on an argument grounded in
property. Should these new torts succeed in the future, that success will
owe a debt to analogies. But the arguments are not yet built. Instead, like
Nockleby, who reduced and diluted a hate-speech tort to appease conser-
vative resistance, 35 Larson argues that an action for sexual fraud is
conservative because it so closely resembles the common-law actions for
misrepresentation and deceit approved in the Restatement.36 This claim
to conservatism is weakened by its dependence on torts. A more fruitful
approach would emphasize the contractual nature of sexual relationships
and other bargains struck in private life, such as the promise to marry.1 37
To be sure, a contract-focused proposal is not what Larson wants; it would
cede considerable ground. And the novelty paradox would still impede the
new cause of action. But as a way to get the new tort moving, a contract
132. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30, 69-77.
133. See Lancman, supra note 2, at 226-30. Lancman concedes that the traditional tort of
conversion would cover the injury suffered by the Daily Pennsylvanian's editors and writers; he argues
that a tort of suppression is necessary to protect speakers like Casey and future victims who would not
have the fortuitous benefit of a traditional tort remedy like conversion. See id. at 227-30.
134. See Larson, supra note 22, at 375.
135. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
136. See Larson, supra note 22, at 453 ("The [only] novelty of my proposal is to apply the
misrepresentation theory in a new relational setting."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 525 (1977).
137. See Neil G. Williams, What toDo When There's No "IDo":A ModelforAwardingDamages
Under Promissory Estoppel, 70 WASH. L. REv. 1019, 1038-39 (1995) (discussing the traditional
"breach-of-promise action," which arose from "the premise that engaged parties enter into contracts
when they, in essence, exchangepromises to marry").
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focus is a more feasible (that is, more conservative) beginning gesture than
is her bow to deceit and misrepresentation causes of action.
Similarly, Lancman will have to compromise in order to exploit a
traditional approach, here based on property theory. As he notes, a
property argument would justify a tort action for suppression based on the
destruction of tangible goods like student newspapers. 138  Former
governor Casey would as yet have no remedy against suppression. Here
too, though, the new tort would have a stronger foundation in a traditional
doctrine than it now has in Lancman's contentions about free speech rights.
Starting with damage to movable property, Lancman could begin to create
by analogy a property right-and a remedy-pertaining to ideas and
expression.
We come now to sexual harassment as a new tort. Writers have
exhorted courts to recognize that sexual harassment may amount to tortious
conduct even in cases where none of the tort labels now used in sexual
harassment cases-mainly assault, battery, intrusion, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress-fits the circumstances exactly. 139  In
circumstances where the complainant did not experience harmful physical
contact and would thus generally be forced to use the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, commentators have urged particular
liberality on two points: the plaintiff should not be required to make any
special proof of outrageousness, and her emotional distress should not
necessarily have to be severe."4 This new tort would join an array of
remedies for harassment that, though numerous, may not be adequate.
The new torts of sexual fraud and suppression have stronger links to
contract and property traditions than does a new tort of sexual harassment,
but these themes can support a sexual harassment tort as well. Because
two new-tort precedents-intentional infliction of emotional distress and
wrongful discharge-have some territory in common with sexual harass-
ment, it may profit proponents of this new tort to consider the contracts-
and property-based arguments that helped to build redress for injuries to
138. See Lancman, supra note 2, at 227-30 (describing the tort and criminal liability which arose
from the incident).
139. See Jane ByeffKorn, The Fungible Woman and Other Myths of Sexual Harassment, 67 TUL.
L. REV. 1363, 1418 (1993) (arguing that although "[a] victim has no guarantee of prevailing in [a] tort
action," it provides a better remedy for sexual harassment than workers' compensation); Paul, supra
note 123, at 335-36 (arguing that a tort claim for sexual harassmentwould provide a better remedy than
Title VII because it would allow for individualized damages and place greater liability on the
responsible individual); Schoenheider, supra note 123, at 1463 (arguingthat becauseboth Title VI and
state tort law fail to redress fully the harms of sexual harassment, the courts should "recognize an
independent cause of action in tort for sexual harassment in the employment context"); Vhay, supra
note 123, at 356-60 (modeling a sexual harassment tort on the Second Restatement's section 48).
140. See Schoenheider, supra note 123, at 1481-85; see also Korn, supra note 139, at 1379
(arguing that current tort law does not fit sexual harassment circumstances).
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mental tranquility and secure employment. Prosser's success in linking
emotional-distress torts with contract may hearten sexual-harassment tort
reformers who feel discouraged in their quest."'
More encouraging is the excellent position the new tort has with
respect to the paradoxes of agency and novelty. Agency is notably absent
here. No person is identified as the impresario stage-managing the new
tort. The major law review contributions in the area are two student-
authored pieces. 42 Catharine MacKinnon has called tort-thinking a
problem rather than a solution in feminist law reform, 43 so she is safely
distant from the proposal. Similarly, the paradox of novelty is being
defeated. The idea of sexual harassment as a tort seems to percolate
steadily through the legal system; one sees casual references in both
caselaw and journalistic accounts to lawsuits for "sexual harassment" even
when the tort labels actually used by plaintiffs were traditional. 1" For
the purpose of creating a new tort, an invisible hand writes better and more
enduringly, though slower, than the hand of a celebrated agent hoping to
effect novelty.
VI. Conclusion
Although new-tort reformers begin with the belief that where there is
a wrong there ought to be a remedy, new torts themselves do not originate
141. A contract rationale gains further support from the concept of good faith, which one commen-
tator perceives as a simple protection of the parties' expectation interests. See Eric G. Anderson, Good
Faith in the Enforcement of Contracts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 299, 347 (1988). An implied covenant of
good faith could recognize a right to a harassment-free workplace, even though this term might not
have received deliberate, explicit attention during the formation of the employment contract. See
STEVEN J. BURTON & ERIC G. ANDERSON, CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH: FORMATION, PERFORMANCE,
BREACH, ENFORCEENT 392 (1995) (noting the influence of "community standards of decency, fairness,
or reasonableness" in good faith cases (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt.
a (1979))). I am grateful to my colleague Richard Warner for sharing his thoughts on this subject.
142. See Schoenheider, supra note 123; Vhay, supra note 123.
143. See supra note 16.
144. See, e.g., Adleta v. General Electric, No. C-1-94-559, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9122, at *7
(S.D. Ohio May 24, 1996) (referring to "plaintiff's sexual harassment tort"); Manko v. Volynsky, No.
95 Civ. 2585, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6328, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 1996) ("Because the only
relationship described in the complaint is a personal relationship, plaintiff cannot maintain a tort claim
for sexual harassment."). Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., 575 N.E.2d 428 (Ohio 1991), is widely believed
to have declared a tort of sexual harassment. See id. at 436-37 ( Holmes, J., dissenting) (characterizing
the majority opinion as having improperly created a new tort); Deborah S. Brenneman, Case Note,
Sexual Harassment Claims and Ohio's Workers'Compensation Statute, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1515, 1535
(1993). In Monteverde v. Baby Superstore, Inc., 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 15 (M.D. Fla.
1995), the plaintiff's attorneys added a count to their complaint called "Tort of Sexual Harassment."
Id. at 16. On motion the defense was able to strike this count, but such a claim is likely to reappear
in future court pleadings. Id.; see also Ulrich v. K-Mart Corp., 858 F. Supp. 1087, 1095 (D. Kan.
1994), af#'d, 70 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 1995) (dismissing theplaintiff's count entitled "Failure to Provide
a Harassment-Free Workplace").
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from this premise. Activists face the future; the common law faces the
past. Conservatism, the bane of reformers, is the force that drives the
common law-while fighting and often defeating the novelty, agency, and
torts-focused attention to rights that animate law-reform efforts.
In short, then, law reform efforts and new torts can be fundamentally
different and incompatible creatures. One will tend to defeat the other.
New-tort reformers are driven to a choice: they can prefer the new tort and
submerge their own agency, their novel contributions, and their righting of
the world into a more just orientation; alternatively, they can prefer their
activism and submerge the new tort. In the work of Catharine MacKinnon
against pornography, observers of American legal change have a clear
exemplar of the latter choice. The work of William Prosser, who built
new torts while disclaiming politics, exemplifies the former. A new
generation of new-tort planners-among whom I have identified Jane
Larson, who has written insightfully about the uses and limitations of tort
to achieve social change145-has available for emulation these two polar
approaches to effecting change in the law. Both approaches have much to
commend them; reformers will not suffer total defeats. If new-tort gains
come at the expense of visible activism and vice versa as I have argued,
then it is equally true that progress continues even when new torts or
visible activist efforts fail.
As between a new tort and a vigorous display of group-based activism,
I admit a bit of bias in favor of the new tort. Last year, I received a letter
from a practicing lawyer who had just won a multimillion dollar verdict in
a sexual harassment case. Having used common-law tort claims rather than
Title VII in an action against a physician by women who were both his
employees and his patients, she reflected on the difference between
common-law traditions and open social activism as they affected the way
she shaped her case:
We didn't have to talk about the esoteric theories of equality in the
workplace and the barriers to it raised by demeaning sexual conduct
or remarks-theories which I have found really only resonate with
women. Instead, men and women alike could easily understand how
powerless, ashamed, frightened, confused, and trapped my clients
felt when they were preyed upon by the man who was not only their
boss-and controlled their paychecks and livelihood-but who had
also insinuated himself into their lives as their physician ... Where
jurors might be hostile to all of this "equality" business (and I've
found that many of them are), they fully understand and identify with
145. See Jane E. Larson, Introduction: Third Wave-Can Feminists Use the Law to Effect Social
Change in the 1990s?, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1252, 1253 (1993) ("Feminism today... is facing up to
the limits of the law as a vehicle of social change.").
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being trapped in a physically and mentally abusive workplace-being
a paycheck hostage.1"
Tradition, analogy, venerable themes, existing doctrines, adaptation
to circumstances, and common sense: surely Prosser, from whatever van-
tage point he now observes tort law, nods his blessing. The measured,
respectful movement of a new tort will always appear feeble to activists,
threatening to its opposition, and of no moment to nearly everyone else;
the few of us who look at new torts with admiration will have much to
appreciate in the coming years, as past activism settles into entrenched
rights and remedies.
146. Letter from Alison M. Steele, Esq. to Anita Bernstein 4 (June 6, 1996) (on file with the
Texas Law Review).
1997] 1565

